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A cooperative instinct 
[published in slightly revised version as a News & Views article in Nature 489, 374- 375 
20 September 2012].  
 
Acting on a gut feeling may sometimes lead to poor decisions, but it will usually support 
the common good, according to a study showing that human intuition favours 
cooperative, rather than selfish, behaviour. See Letter p. XXX 
 
Simon Gächter 
 
In a recent bestselling book, psychologist and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman presents 
a wealth of evidence that much of human decision-making is governed by fast and 
automatic intuitions, rather than by slow, effortful thinking1. Intuitions can sometimes 
lead us astray, such as when it comes to processing statistical information, but our ‘gut 
feelings’ also serve us well in many common situations. One interesting question is to ask 
how intuition influences social decisions that pit self-interest against collective benefit. 
Does intuition support cooperation, or do people need time to reflect before deciding to 
pull their weight? On page XXX of this issue, Rand et al.2 present evidence that the 
intuitive human reaction is to cooperate, whereas reasoning makes people somewhat 
more selfish.  
  
If evolution favours self-interest, then people should be equipped with intuitions that help 
them figure out how to maximise their individual gain3. However, recent research in the 
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behavioural sciences challenges the idea that people are mostly selfish4. Some theories to 
explain variations in individuals’ behaviour, based on social preferences5, assume that 
people differ in their motivation to act in a cooperative manner, but not in their reasoning 
style6. Furthermore, psychological studies have suggested that moral judgements are 
often made intuitively7, and because many people view ‘freeloading’ on other people's 
contributions as being morally blameworthy8, it is plausible that moral intuitions support 
cooperation.   
 
To directly investigate the role of intuitions in cooperation, Rand and colleagues used a 
series of ten public-goods game experiments. In these games, people can choose to either 
keep an allocation of resources for themselves, or contribute all or a portion of their 
allocation to a collective good, which is then distributed evenly among all players. The 
authors conducted some of the games using an international pool of subjects sourced 
from an online labour market (Amazon Mechanical Turk), and some in-person in the 
laboratory. 
 
Because intuitions are quickly available, whereas deliberation takes time, Rand et al. 
started by investigating the link between response time and contributions. Previous 
research on response time across a variety of decisions shows that people choose intuitive 
options more quickly than those requiring cognitive effort9, and results from a simple 
sharing experiment suggest that faster choices are more selfish10. However, this is not 
what Rand and colleagues found in their online experiments. Instead, their results 
indicate that contributions and decision time are negatively correlated — the faster half of 
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decision makers contributed, on average, about 67% of their allocated resources, while 
the slower half contributed about 53%. The authors also detected a similar relationship 
between response time and cooperation in experiments conducted in person, so the 
observed correlation seems to be robust.  
 
But correlations are of course no proof of causation. To try to plausibly demonstrate a 
causal link, Rand and colleagues put the game players under time pressure and observed 
how this affected their decisions. Previous results of bargaining game experiments 
suggests that time pressure leads to fairer outcomes11 and also increases the likelihood 
that a person will impulsively reject an unfair offer12,13. Furthermore, having to decide 
under time pressure is stressful and stress also increases pro-social behaviour14. So it is 
clear that time pressure, which favours intuitions over reflection, influences social 
considerations. Rand et al. show that this extends to cooperation: in their experiments, 
people under time pressure contributed significantly more than those who made their 
decisions with no time limit or with a forced delay. Thus, it seems that forcing a person to 
decide more rapidly — by intuition — increases their cooperative tendency.  
 
In a final set of experiments, the authors used a writing task to prime participants to think 
intuitively or reflectively before performing the public-goods game. They found that 
those primed to use intuition contributed more than those put in reflective mode. Rand 
and colleagues also found that people who experience their interaction partners in daily 
life as being cooperative cooperate more when primed to use intuition than when primed 
to use reflection. This result is consistent with a point made by economist Herbert Simon, 
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who said that “intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition”15.  Thus, it 
seems that when people are used to cooperative partners they develop cooperative 
intuitions.   
 
Rand and colleagues’ study raises interesting concepts for experiments in the social 
sciences, both in terms of questions that would be worthy of further investigation, and 
how to conduct such experiments. For example, their findings suggest that the common 
practice of researchers asking participants comprehension questions before an experiment 
will provide conservative estimates of people’s cooperativeness, because the questioning 
will put people into reflective mode, which Rand and colleagues have shown is likely to 
result in them behaving less cooperatively. So is this questioning practice justified? It 
may be in many cases, such as in studies of people’s economic decisions, as economists 
are typically interested in reflected behaviour.  
 
The study also indicates that intuitions may be particularly important in novel situations, 
and experience might trigger reflection that either supports or modifies the initial 
intuitions. Should (economic) theories based on social motivations5 take intuitions into 
account even if the main importance of intuition is (only) in initiating cooperation?  
Future research should clarify. Furthermore, the authors observe — and economic and 
evolutionary theories should attempt to explain — that many (but not all) people are 
cooperative whether deciding fast or slow, or intuitively or reflectively, and time pressed 
or not. For example, even in the experiments in which Rand et al. recorded the biggest 
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difference between intuitive and reflective contributions, the amount of contributions 
made under reflective conditions exceeded the difference added by intuition.  
 
Finally, existing research suggests that some people are selfish free-rider types, whereas 
others are conditional cooperators who are willing to contribute if others do so6. This 
observation needs to be squared with Rand and colleagues’ results: might it be that 
conditional cooperators are intuitively cooperative and selfish people take a reflected free 
ride? The authors have demonstrated that, on average, our intuition is to cooperate, but 
further studies are needed to understand the variation of this behaviour between 
individuals.  
 
Simon Gächter is in the Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, 
University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK. Support under ERC-AdG 295707 
COOPERATION is gratefully acknowledged.  
e-mail: simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
1. Kahneman, D. Thinking, fast and slow (Allen Lane, 2011). 
2. Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D. & Nowak, M. A. Nature 489, XXX–XXX (2012). 
3. Moore, D. & Loewenstein, G. Social Justice Res. 17, 189–202 (2004). 
4. Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and its 
Evolution (Princeton Univ. Press, 2011). 
5. Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and 
Reciprocity (eds Kolm, S.-C. & Ythier, J. M.) (Elsevier, 2006).
 6 
6. Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. & Quercia, S. J. Econ. Psychol. 33, 897–913 (2012). 
7. Haidt, J. The Righteous Mind. Why Good People are Divided by Politics and 
Religion (Allen Lane, 2012). 
8. Cubitt, R. P., Drouvelis, M., Gächter, S. & Kabalin, R. J. Public Econ. 95, 253–
264 (2011). 
9. Rubinstein, A. Econ. J. 117, 1243–1259 (2007). 
10. Piovesan, M. & Wengström, E. Econ. Lett. 105, 193–196(2009). 
11. Cappelletti, D., Güth, W. & Ploner, M. J. Econ. Psychol. 32, 940–951 (2011). 
12. Grimm, V. & Mengel, F. Econ. Lett. 111, 113–115 (2011). 
13. Sutter, M., Kocher, M. & Strauss, S. Econ. Lett. 81, 341–347 (2003). 
14. von Dawans, B., Fischbacher, U., Kirschbaum, C., Fehr, E. & Heinrichs, M. 
Psychol. Sci. 23, 651–550 (2012). 
15. Simon, H. A. Psychol. Sci. 3, 150–161 (1992). 
 
